Home Cuba Underdeveloped Dictatorships: Less Legitimate but More Stable

Underdeveloped Dictatorships: Less Legitimate but More Stable

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Underdeveloped Dictatorships: Less Legitimate but More Stable
Underdeveloped Dictatorships: Less Legitimate but More Stable

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina – Reports on the state of democracy worldwide agree that there is a certain rise in dictatorships. When autocracies are on an upward trend, it can happen that some of them start to appear as effective models for material development.

This was the case with the USSR from the late 1930s, when that dictatorship seemed to catapult a backward, rural, and primitive country into becoming a global industrial power. Millions of people around the world were drawn to this mirage, until the flaws of the system became evident, the masks fell, and a blocked and decaying society was exposed.

Today, something similar might be happening with China, which in recent months has surpassed the United States in several important economic indicators. If this autocratic model is able to manage conflicts and expand the economy, some might view it as a realistic alternative to the endless uncertainties of democratic processes.

But China may be reaching that moment of truth that the USSR encountered at one point in its history, when the model makes it clear that it is a burden. Last September, The Financial Times published a report highlighting clear examples of how the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is stifling major Chinese entrepreneurs. Dictatorships seem to reach a point where they destroy the prosperity they create. It’s the logic of the scorpion, as rock musician Charly García would say.

Then there’s the uncomfortable example of Singapore, a country with significant economic prosperity and an abundance of direct investments, yet at the same time a place with a severely constrained press that ranks among the lowest in Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom index. That scorpion has not yet stung the economy, nor is there any sign of a transition toward loosening control.

In Latin America, our wave of military dictatorships in the 1960s and 70s was also motivated by development ambitions. Large segments of intellectual and social sectors believed the military was the key actor for creating development leaps that would overcome internal conflicts.

Fortunately, that illusion no longer exists today. The existing dictatorships in our region have no economic capacity. In fact, an unusual family of underdeveloped dictatorships has emerged, making their respective populations increasingly poorer.

Our version of Singapore might be El Salvador, where a “dictator much loved by his people” is in power, as Oscar Martínez, a journalist from local outlet El Faro, puts it. It’s possible that this autocratic scorpion could bring that small, precious country into this unusual family as well.

Eradicating Journalism

The latest report from the 2024 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), presented by CADAL, shows that Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are members of a fairly homogeneous group in which a comprehensive de-individualization process is taking shape. This implies that both individually and collectively, the political, social, economic, and cultural energy of people is being blocked.

This group of countries shares certain obvious traits. The first is the destruction of electoral democracy. Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel, Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello are pairs of leaders who leave no doubt that they will not surrender power peacefully. They have gradually removed all the masks of democratic formalities.

The attack on journalism is also obvious. Given the essential relationship between journalism and rights, in a society without rights, journalism must necessarily be eradicated. In Cuba and Nicaragua, journalism has been forced into exile, and Venezuela may soon be headed in the same direction. The Inter-American Press Association recently awarded journalism in exile the 2024 Grand Prize for Press Freedom. Of course, the same fate befalls any cultural or artistic initiative that could be interpreted as dissident. Cuban artist-activists are either imprisoned or in internal or external exile.

These regimes also have dissidents, not opposition. When Alexei Navalny was in London before falling once more into the lethal grip of Vladimir Putin’s regime, he complained to the Financial Times editorial board that they labeled him a dissident rather than opposition, as he preferred. Cuba and Nicaragua have succeeded in muting opposition into mere dissidence, which is more symbolic and poses a lesser challenge to real power. They have managed to externalize polarization, with one of the antagonistic poles effectively pushed beyond territorial borders. Today, Venezuela’s opposition struggles to prevent this same outcome.

Of course, corruption is also widespread and goes unpunished. In all three countries, oversight mechanisms are porous. In Cuba, the main company, GAESA—a military holding company—operates above all audits, with corruption embedded in everyday life. The BTI report notes that on the island, there is “widespread everyday corruption, fostering a mindset that rules are meant to be broken.” Nicaraguan journalists from Confidencial, led by Carlos Fernando Chamorro, have uncovered numerous corruption cases, as have Venezuelan journalists from Armando.Info, edited by Ewald Scharfenberg. The impression is that these autocracies mirror the corruption of the powerful with the corruption of ordinary citizens who must make do to survive day-to-day.

However, there is one area where they are not inefficient: repression. In fact, they are flexible and innovative in this regard. They learn through the three methods outlined by the BTI: personal experience, international experience, and consulting resources. The contributions from Russia, China, and Iran in this area are evident. This cooperation is reminiscent of the repressive consulting practices of the previous era of Latin American military dictatorships, inspired by intellectual frameworks from France and the United States.

In addition to these common traits of underdeveloped dictatorships, there is also economic self-blockade, which paralyzes even the initiatives of state agencies. The BTI reports that “under Nicolás Maduro’s presidency, the country’s GDP has shrunk by more than three-quarters—the deepest depression ever experienced without war.” It notes that Nicaragua ranks 126th in the Human Development Index. And regarding Cuba, it details how deeply economic progress is discouraged: “Antitrust laws are only applied to the private small business sector to prevent what the government considers ‘enrichment.’” If the state’s goal is to prevent wealth creation, there is simply no way to generate prosperity.

Eggs Delivered to Your Door

The core issue for this family of dictatorships seems to lie in their external relations. The successive cycles of protests in these three countries are managed by the governments first with violent repression, then through imprisonment, and finally by pushing protest leaders into exile, thereby deflating waves of discontent. The events in Venezuela following the electoral fraud on July 28 followed this pattern.

The inevitable consequence of political and economic repression is a migration collapse, which further consolidates autocratic political control. In Venezuela, the prospect of elections had briefly rekindled hope. Among the eight million who had emigrated, there were Venezuelans considering a return. If this new hope is dashed, another wave of mass migration will be inevitable. Even Cuba, which has endured over six decades of uninterrupted emigration, continues to surprise us. In 2022, it experienced the largest migration wave in its history, with around 300,000 Cubans heading to the United States and thousands more going to Europe or Latin America. The United States recorded the highest number of Nicaraguans attempting to enter the country in 2022, and over half of Nicaraguans say they want to leave the country.

Lastly, this mass migration not only frees these regimes from potential hotspots of internal unrest and activist leaders, but it also facilitates remittances that support a minimal welfare state. In Cuba, remittances amount to around $3 billion annually. Remittances are so critical to the regime that the state-run Granma newspaper regularly informs readers on safe ways to send funds. As the saying goes, “a confession is proof enough.”

A new form of remittances has even emerged from Miami. Many people are no longer sending money, but essential goods directly, even eggs. Receiving dollars is no longer as valuable because if there’s nothing to buy on the island, cash is useless. “Getting eggs is incredibly important… it guarantees us breakfast,” says a Cuban woman in an interview with the French agency AFP, while receiving a package with ground turkey, ham, chorizo, croquettes, and yogurt.

In Nicaragua, remittances have “grown exponentially in recent years,” according to the BTI, doubling in 2023 from the previous year. They accounted for 26.1% of the local GDP. Although Venezuela’s external income is based on other sources, millions of Venezuelans in the diaspora send up to 60% of their income to support their families back home, even as inflation in their host countries devalues their earnings and thus their remittances.

Putting all these factors together, we get a complete picture of underdeveloped dictatorships. The final paradox is that these regimes are increasingly less legitimate, yet more stable. The BTI notes that “the Ortega dictatorship in Nicaragua is more consolidated than ever” and that, in Cuba, “frustration and resignation have permeated the entire society.”

In Venezuela, María Corina Machado’s campaign slogan, “Until the End,” fights against a harsh reality. The democracy of the 1970s that once generously welcomed Latin American exiles now suffers, as if by historical revenge, from the persistent, pernicious grip of dictatorship.

Of course, the inability of democracies in the region to organize coherent pressure is our own external support for the consolidation of these dictatorships.

Article written by Fernando J. Ruiz, Professor of Journalism and Democracy at Universidad Austral and academic advisor to CADAL.

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