With the appointment of Marco Rubio, Mexico’s new president Claudia Sheinbaum will be faced with a fundamental question: Is it worth it to continue subsidizing what remains of the Castro era, even though doing so poisons Mexico’s relations with the US?
By Jorge Castañeda (Confidencial)
HAVANA TIMES – President-elect Donald Trump has already announced his picks for the cabinet positions that most affect Mexico, except for a Commerce Secretary and representative of international trade. Both will probably end up under the aegis of Robert Lighthizer, the T-MEC [U.S.–Canada–Mexico Trade Agreement] negotiator, a devoted believer in the weakness that trade deficits insert into any economy, and in the use of tariffs as a remedy.
Others have already commented on the implications of Trump’s selection of figures such as Tom Homan and Stephen Miller for immigration issues, highlighting the insistence of both on “massive deportations” of undocumented immigrants, and on closing the border. The designations of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Michael Waltz as National Security Advisor have been less discussed in Mexico, since they were only announced on November 11.
I’d like to focus on Rubio and on the consequences for Mexico of his probable, although still pending, nomination, considering that he first must be ratified by the US Senate.
As is generally known, Marco Rubio is Cuban-American, born in Miami of Cuban parents who left the island in 1956, before the Revolution. They didn’t come as refugees fleeing the Castro regime, although Rubio frequently tries to imply that they did, and he himself has been a rabid enemy of the Castro dictatorship. Until a short time ago, he was one of three Cuban-American senators (the other two are Ted Cruz and Bob Menendez).
All through his career in the Senate, which began in 2010, Rubio concentrated on foreign policy in general, and policies towards Latin America in particular. Obviously, he’s favored greater U.S. sanctions against Cuba and Venezuela, and to a lesser degree against Nicaragua, and he opposed the normalization of relations that Obama attempted to carry out in 2015-16.
He’s been ultra-critical of the Lopez-Amador government, accusing AMLO of turning over half the country to the cartels, and of serving as an accomplice of dictators Miguel Diaz-Canel, Daniel Ortega, and Nicolas Maduro, in addition to ceding to authoritarian temptations in Mexico itself.
News of Marco Rubio’s appointment was well received in the United States: first because Trump could have picked someone more extremist; and secondly, because Rubio is seen as a professional with experience in foreign policy. That’s not completely true, but in the United States, as in Mexico, the “commentocracy” grabs on to whatever it can to project optimism. Above all, they’ve highlighted Rubio’s virulent positions against China, and in favor of Israel and Netanyahu. He’s recently toned down his denunciation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, insinuating that Ukrainian president Zelensky must soon resign himself to losing a part of Ukrainian territory, not joining NATO, and reaching an agreement with Putin.
For Mexico’s Fourth Transformation [Former President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s 2018 campaign promise to do away with abuses that had plagued Mexico in decades past], the figure of Marco Rubio presents some complications. This would be true for any government, but for the first time in history the most anti-Castro government of the US (speaking of both the president and his pick for secretary of state) since John F. Kennedy in the sixties, is going to coincide with Mexico’s most pro-Cuban government (again speaking of both the president and the secretary of foreign relations) since the presidency of Adolfo Lopez Mateus from 1958 to 1964.
If Cuba and Venezuela were the only two contentious issues in the bilateral agenda, Mexico’s gifts of oil to Havana and the hiring of up to six thousand Cuban doctors to work in Mexico wouldn’t be unmanageable disagreements. But that’s not the case. Marco Rubio is adept at the hard line on immigration issues – although he did support a bipartisan immigration agreement under Obama – and especially on all that relates to fentanyl and the war against organized crime in Mexico. What we don’t know is whether he has become critical of everything Mexican solely because of these elements, in addition to his anti-Castro convictions, or if his hostility to the Fourth Transformation platform really stems from the pro-Castroism embedded in that platform.
It would take an enormous effort for any Mexican government to deal with a second term of someone like Trump. His attitudes on issues such as immigration, China, organized crime, Venezuela, and Cuba would be difficult for even the most experienced, intelligent, and honest team to face. There are no ideal solutions for any of the challenges Trump presents; all the options are bad.
There are few good answers to two major questions, one of form, the other of substance. The question of form: Is it advisable to continue insisting that nothing is going on, or is it preferable to recognize that the panorama is cloudy, to say the least? The deeper question is: with so many other important things in play, do we want to die trying to save the Cuban dictatorship? Is it worth it to continue subsidizing what is left of the Castro regime, although in doing so in this juncture we will definitely be poisoning our relationship with the United States?
Jorge Castañeda is a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico (2000-2003).
Published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.
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