The decision came just one month after Biden had declared otherwise, extending Cuba’s designation on the list for another year.
Editorial by El Toque
HAVANA TIMES – The announcement of seemingly unilateral but interconnected decisions by the administrations in Havana and Washington surprised the entire political spectrum on January 14, 2025.
President Joe Biden used his executive authority to certify that Cuba did not meet the criteria to remain on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. This decision came just one month after his administration had declared otherwise, extending Cuba’s designation on the list for another year.
Similarly, the US President renewed for six months the waiver suspending Title III of the Helms-Burton Act (or LIBERTAD Act). He also repealed another executive decision by President Donald Trump, which had established a list of specially designated Cuban entities barred from US business dealings, including the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and its Business Administration Group (GAESA).
For its part, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) announced that in early January 2025, Miguel Diaz-Canel had written to Pope Francis, informing him of “the decision to grant freedom to 553 individuals sentenced for various offenses.”
In Washington, it is claimed that President Biden’s decision was made after learning of this message from the Communist Party via Pope Francis.
It appears that confronted with a choice between encouraging prisoner releases with measures highly desired by the Cuban government or doing nothing—continuing the course confirmed just a month earlier—Biden opted for steps he believed could promote the release of hundreds of individuals unjustly detained for political reasons.
US officials say they submitted lists of high-profile prisoners they hoped to see released, although they acknowledge that some will be freed, while others may not. They also admit there is no guarantee of full freedom for those released, as prisoners may face varied conditions.
The effectiveness and timeliness of Biden’s move have been central to debates following his announcement and Cuba’s “independent” response. Over four years, both administrations tried negotiating but repeatedly hit an impasse: Biden refused to ease sanctions unless the Cuban government released prisoners, especially after the repressive crackdown following the July 11, 2021, protests. The Cuban authorities consistently refused to make any such move.
What changed at the end of Biden’s term?
In just six days, President Donald Trump will begin his new term, appointing Senator Marco Rubio—a staunch critic of rapprochement with Cuba—as head of US foreign policy.
Examining the script of recent events, it is plausible to think this might be an indirect influence strategy orchestrated from Havana. According to Washington, Biden’s abrupt shift was motivated exclusively by communication with the Pope. So sudden was the decision that it even caught Secretary of State Antony Blinken off guard. Just a week earlier, during a session of the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Blinken assured Representative Maria Elvira Salazar that no policy changes toward Cuba were expected before Biden’s term ended. After the January 14th announcement, Salazar claimed Blinken called her to explain that the decision was made directly in the Oval Office, not his department.
The chain reaction set off by Diaz-Canel’s letter to Pope Francis in early January seems coincidental, considering Biden’s decision can be reversed in less than a week once Trump is inaugurated. Yet political reality suggests the Cuban regime has gained time—a resource it lacked until now.
The announced measures have their own bureaucratic timelines for implementation or reversal. Meanwhile, the Trump administration will have its hands full with a lengthy agenda. Biden’s removal of Cuba from the terrorism sponsors list, based on an argument that ongoing negotiations might include the release of political prisoners, introduces a new variable for the incoming administration to consider before reinserting Cuba into the list.
By establishing the rules of the game from Havana, the Cuban regime secures a wide margin for maneuvering. Ultimately, more than a gesture of humanitarianism within Cuba’s penal and prison systems—as MINREX claims—prisoner releases address the pressing needs of the overcrowded Cuban prison system. In its announcement of the release of over 500 prisoners, MINREX also admitted that between 2023 and 2024, Cuba had voluntarily released approximately 10,000 people.
If Trump immediately reinstates Cuba on the terrorism sponsors list or imposes new sanctions, Havana’s response might be to exclude “political prisoners” from the release process. Officially, Cuba has committed only to releasing individuals “legally sentenced for various offenses.” High-profile prisoners Washington previously expressed interest in could remain as key “hostages.”
Beyond Havana’s maneuvering, initial benefits may arise from Cuba’s removal from the list. While the designation aims to pressure the Cuban government, it also impacts ordinary citizens—innocent victims of the repressive machinery.
For example, there is great interest in whether this will ease travel restrictions to the US for European citizens of Cuban descent, particularly Cuban-Spaniards. Likewise, whether it will reduce the difficulties in opening bank accounts for Cuban emigrants arriving in other countries where thousands of compatriots are landing, fleeing a country that sponsors terrorism.
However, as potential positive outcomes materialize, Cuba is likely to release prisoners gradually, seeking to keep the new US administration at bay by offering prisoner releases as leverage, avoiding that Trump immediately reverses the measures taken by Biden.
Following the announcements, our main concern is the lack of clarity about what this indirect agreement means for the hundreds of potential released prisoners in the coming days. Official communications leave everything hanging on an imprecise release schedule.
The Cuban regime insists these are “releases” demonstrating the “fair and humanitarian nature of Cuba’s penal and prison systems.” In reality, these are conditional releases that keep prisoners under the constant threat of re-incarceration if they fail to comply with imposed conditions.
We are also deeply concerned that the lack of transparency in this process might ultimately conceal, to the regime’s benefit, an even greater injustice: the re-victimization of dozens of Cuban political prisoners who for months have been denied legally entitled benefits. These same benefits are now being showcased as proof of the regime’s humanity.
For instance, if Luis Robles, one of the most emblematic prisoners of conscience in recent years, is released tomorrow, it would come long after he had become eligible for parole, with only a few months remaining on his full five-year sentence.
President Biden has chosen to trust the honesty and goodwill of Cuba’s leaders, relying on their promise to Pope Francis that 553 prisoners will be freed. Let us be clear: the release of even one political prisoner is excellent news, and 553 would be even better. However, without clear safeguards and formal agreements, it falls to civil society to monitor and document who is released, under what conditions, and—most importantly—who remains behind bars.
First published in Spanish by El Toque and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.
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